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their place. He claims that alcohol never acts as a stimulant, saying : "Ueberhaupt hat der Alkohol nur lähmende Eigenschaften." We need not repeat the arguments which he offers against even a temperate use of alcoholic drinks, for they are the same that are found in the usual temperance literature. The reviewer was quite impressed to find so good an authority as Professor Bunge among the teetotalers, and being a moderate drinker himself, felt much inclined to become an absolute abstainer, when he was saved by the statistics of Goethe's indulgence in hock and claret, the quantities of which are appalling and would be sufficient to fill a well-sized bathing tank. It is a pity that, having lost the paper in which the item was mentioned, we cannot give the exact figures; but consider that Goethe drank wine daily with his meals, and on festive occasions, in the lodge or at other social gatherings, he frequently drank a whole bottle, or even more, and yet none of the evil results fell upon him. Neither his stomach nor his kidneys nor his brain were noticeably deranged. He lived to a good old age, continuing his habit of drinking wine to the very end of his life, and wrote in his seventieth year the second part of *Faust*, a work which few people who train themselves in abstinence from alcoholic drinks could improve upon.

The pernicious effect of all kinds of liquors of which Professor Bunge speaks may be true enough of immoderate drinkers, but not generally, while on the other hand tea and coffee are probably not quite so harmless as he represents them. The very quality for which advocates of temperance recommend them, renders their poison insidious. Too much wine intoxicates, and there is a limit to indulgence in it, but too much coffee renders one sleepless and brings on a number of neurotic diseases the worst of which are quite as bad as delirium tremens.

We have no intention of discussing the problem of prohibition, and must therefore stop, but while we recommend Professor Bunge to our prohibition friends as one of their mightiest allies, we wish to say that the weakness of his *raisonnement* on alcohol does not detract from the general excellence of his work, which is full of valuable information and should be translated into English by a competent pen.

P. C.

SYSTEM DER WERTTHEORIE. I. Band. Allgemeine Werttheorie, Psychologie des Begehrrens. II. Band. Grundzüge einer Ethik. By Dr. Christian von Ehrenfels, Professor der Philosophie an der deutschen Universität in Prag. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland. 1898. Pp., 277+270.

UEBER DAS SOLLEN UND DAS GUTE. Eine begriffsanalytische Untersuchung. By Fred Bon. Leipsic: Wilhelm Engelmann. 1898. Pp., 188.

DER BEGRIFF DES ABSOLUT WERTVOLLEN ALS GRUNDBEGRIFF DER MORALPHILOSOPHIE. By Dr. Felix Krueger. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner. 1898. Pp., 93. Price, 2.80 Mk.

Valuation (or *Werthung*) is a term which was originally coined by economical writers and has of late come to play a prominent part in German ethics. There is

no modern treatise on morality in whose pages we should not find an exposition of the nature of "values" applied to moral sentiments and actions. Kant's formalism is commonly deemed antiquated, and the hedonistic ideal of utilitarianism has been introduced in Germany by the late Professor Gyzicki and the Danish ethicist Höffding. It was mainly Gyzicki who thought that morality had no sense, except we could measure the worth of actions in sentiments. Since then the idea of gauging ethics by some kind of value has remained in the foreground, and we meet now with serious attempts to define the meaning of valuation.

The first of the books under review undertakes to lay down the foundation of ethics in a system of valuation, defining worth in terms of desire. Ehrenfels says: "We do not desire things, because we recognise in them that mystical and intangible essence called worth (which is merely a metaphysical illusion), but we deem them valuable because we desire them" (pp. 3 and 52). This definition leads to a discussion of the relation between feeling and desire, both of which belong to one and the same class of fundamental phenomena, but we should learn that feeling depends upon desire, not *vice versa* (p. 10). In opposition to Kant, Ehrenfels teaches that reason can exercise only an indirect influence upon volition, and that any theory of the autonomous supremacy of reason is an unnatural idea (pp. 9-10). Any desire or volition is actualised only when the state of happiness that depends on it lies higher in the scale of feelings than that other state of happiness which would obtain if the act were not done (pp. 35-36). On the one hand, our author rejects the proposition that values are determined by egotistic desires alone; on the other hand, he declines to recognise the ideal of something that possesses absolute value as practical. Value, being a relation between subject and object, is necessarily relative, and the amount of a value is proportionate to the intensity of the desire as well as the difference between the two states of feeling in case the object be or be not attained (p. 65).

After a review of the import of valuation in the struggle for life and the evolution of types, and a psychological analysis of desire, Professor Ehrenfels lays in the second volume of his work the foundation of ethics as a psychology of moral valuation which must be regarded as a special branch of a theory of valuation in general. In this way he proposes to avoid, on the one hand, the antiquated doctrine of an absolute normative ethics; and on the other hand, a relativistic historical ethics. This second part contains an analysis of ethical valuations, a discussion of the ethical development, of moral maxims, custom, and justice, the individual ethics of conscience, etc., and in conclusion determines the nature of ethics as a theoretico-practical discipline whose task in practical life will be to investigate all the regulative social desires, evaluate them with reference to the desirability of their aim, or, if necessary, to replace the antiquated aims by new and more adequate ones (258).

Fred Bon also treats the problem of ethical valuation (p. 166), and finds the difficulty in the haziness that surrounds the conception of the ought, which he treats in a triple gradation, asking first, "What shall I do?" Secondly (consider-

ing in general the aim or purpose of the ought), "What shall I do in order to attain this or that end?" And, thirdly, "What shall I do to be happy?" The third question reappears in the other formulation, "What shall I be?" The author does not intend in the present pamphlet to give an exposition of moral goodness, but only to prepare the field in a philosophical *Vorarbeit*, and thus to indicate the foundation for a scientific ethics.

While most of our modern ethicists would regard the idea of absolute value as something self-contradictory, Felix Krueger proposes to utilise this stone of offence rejected by the builders and to make it the head of the corner. His ethics is based upon the solution of the question, "What possesses for man an absolute value?" (P. 3). While he does not advocate a reckless return to Kant, he believes that we have not yet drawn to-day all the consequences of his ethical doctrine; he proposes to transcend Kant by understanding him. In contrast to the view that identifies value with desirability, Krueger discovers value only in the constancy of desirability. Valuable is not what I desire under given conditions, but that which also remains or must remain an object of volition. Krueger believes that the idea of valuation alone can overcome the ethical eudæmonism of our age (p. 45). He says that the main thing is to organise (i. e., join harmoniously) the possibly greatest variety of volitions through psychical functions (p. 66), and thus we reach "the ethical ideal" which consists in this, that "one shall develop as much as possible into an evaluating man—*ein werthender Mensch.*" (P. 79.)

P. C.

BEITRÄGE ZUR PHYSIOLOGIE DES CENTRALNERVENSYSTEMS. Von Max Verworn.

Dr. med., a. o. Professor der Physiologie an der Universität Jena. Erster Theil. Die sogenannte Hypnose der Thiere. Mit 18 Abbildungen im Text. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer. 1898. Price, 2.50 Mk.

Max Verworn possesses the ability of presenting a topic in an interesting way and the present pamphlet will be welcome to many who desire a popular explanation of the various symptoms of those phenomena which go by the name of animal hypnosis. The reader will be pleased to find a literal quotation of the famous passage¹ of Kirchner's *Experimentum Mirabile de Imaginatione Gallinæ*, together with the original woodcut of the hypnotised hen (See p. 318). That this famous Jesuit cannot lay any claim to the discovery of this trick has been proved by Preyer who called attention to a description of the same experiment which Schwenter² made ten years before the appearance of Kirchner's *Ars Magna*. The experiment was regarded as a phenomenon of magnetism and in modern days of hypnotism, and similar experiments have been made by Czermak and others with other animals. Verworn passes in review the experiments made on birds, mammals, reptiles, amphibia, and the crayfish. The results on fishes, as obtained by Danilewski,

¹Athanasius Kirchner, *Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae*, Rome, 1646.

²Daniel Schwenter, *Delicie Physico-Mathematicæ oder mathematische und philosophische Erquickungsstunden*, etc. Nürnberg, 1636.